Neural Representations of Emotion Are Organized around Abstract Event Features  by Skerry, Amy E. & Saxe, Rebecca
ArticleNeural Representations of Emotion Are Organized
around Abstract Event FeaturesHighlightsd Patterns in ToM brain regions represent subtle emotion
attributions
d These emotion attributions are well captured by a space of
abstract event features
d This space outperforms competitors in capturing
representations in ToM regions
d These neural representations are not reducible to primitive
dimensions like valenceSkerry and Saxe, 2015, Current Biology 25, 1945–1954
August 3, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.06.009Authors




Skerry and Saxe find patterns of neural
activity representing fine-grained
emotional attributions, well captured by a
space of abstract event features. These
findings show that it is possible to
characterize the detailed representational
structure of an essential human reasoning
capacity—the ability to infer the
emotional states of others.
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Research on emotion attribution has tended to focus
on the perception of overt expressions of at most five
or six basic emotions. However, our ability to identify
others’ emotional states is not limited to perception
of these canonical expressions. Instead, we make
fine-grained inferences about what others feel based
on the situations they encounter, relying on knowl-
edge of the eliciting conditions for different emo-
tions. In the present research, we provide convergent
behavioral and neural evidence concerning the rep-
resentations underlying these concepts. First, we
find that patterns of activity in mentalizing regions
contain information about subtle emotional distinc-
tions conveyed through verbal descriptions of elicit-
ing situations. Second, we identify a space of ab-
stract situation features that well captures the
emotion discriminations subjects make behaviorally
and show that this feature space outperforms
competing models in capturing the similarity space
of neural patterns in these regions. Together, the
data suggest that our knowledge of others’ emotions
is abstract and high dimensional, that brain regions
selective for mental state reasoning support rela-
tively subtle distinctions between emotion concepts,
and that the neural representations in these regions
are not reducible to more primitive affective dimen-
sions such as valence and arousal.
INTRODUCTION
Others’ emotional states can be identified by diverse cues in-
cluding facial expressions [1], vocalizations [2], or body posture
[3]. However, we can also attribute subtle emotions based solely
on the situation a person encounters [4, 5], and our vocabulary
for attributing these states extends beyond the emotions associ-
ated with canonical emotional displays [6]. While the space
of emotions perceived in faces has been studied extensively
[7–9], little is known about how conceptual knowledge of others’
emotions is organized, or how that knowledge is encoded in the
human brain. What neural mechanisms underlie fine-grained at-
tributions (e.g., distinguishing when someone will feel angry
versus disappointed)? Here, we suggest that emotion attributionCurrent Biology 25, 1945recruits a rich theory of the causal context of different emotions
and show that dimensions of this intuitive knowledge underlie
emotion representations in brain regions associated with theory
of mind (ToM).
Previous research suggests that others’ emotions are repre-
sented at varying levels of abstraction throughout face-selective
and ToM brain regions. For example, different facial expressions
elicit discriminable patterns of activity in the superior temporal
sulcus (STS) and fusiform gyrus [10, 11]. In contrast, the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) has been shown to contain representa-
tions of emotion that are invariant to perceptual modality [12, 13]
and generalize to emotions inferred in the absence of any overt
display [14]. However, all of these studies focused on coarse dis-
tinctions, decoding either valence [14] or five basic emotions
[13]. Does the MPFC also support more fine-grained emotional
discriminations? To address this question, we constructed ver-
bal stimuli (see Table 1) describing situations that would elicit 1
of 20 different emotions in a character (validated using 20-alter-
native-forced-choice [AFC] behavioral experiment with indepen-
dent subjects; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) and
used multi-voxel pattern analysis [15] to test which regions
contain information about these subtle emotional distinctions.
As a first step, we trained a classifier to distinguish the 20
emotions using distributed patterns of activity across voxels in
a region and tested whether the emotion category of a new
stimulus can be classified based on the pattern of neural activity
it elicits. In addition to whole-brain analyses, we focused on
a priori regions of interest (ROIs), the strongest candidates
being subregions of MPFC—dorsal medial prefrontal cortex
(DMPFC) and middle medial prefrontal cortex (MMPFC) [13,
14]. We also tested other regions of the ToM network [16]: precu-
neus (PC), bilateral temporal parietal junction (TPJ), and right
STS (RSTS).
We then used representational similarity analysis (RSA; [17]) to
test competing hypotheses about the representational spaces in
these regions. RSA complements classification analyses by
providing a framework for characterizing representational struc-
ture and for testing competing models of that structure [17, 18].
In RSA, neural population codes are represented in terms of the
similarity of neural patterns elicited by different stimuli or condi-
tions. A neural representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM) of the
conditions can then be compared to the similarity spaces
captured by a number of different models [18, 19]. Importantly,
RSA allows for comparison of hypotheses that take different
forms and have different numbers of parameters. The correlation
betweenmodel and neural RDMs has no free parameters, mean-
ing that a model will not provide a better fit to the data simply–1954, August 3, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1945
Table 1. Example Stimuli
Stimulus
Type Example Stimulus
Emotion After an 18-hr flight, Caitlin arrived at her vacation
destination to learn that her baggage (including necessary
camping gear for her trip) had not made the flight. After
waiting at the airport for two nights, Caitlin was informed
that the airline had lost her luggage altogether and would
not provide any compensation.
For months, Naomi had been struggling to keep up with
her various projects at work. One week, the company
announced that they would be making massive payroll
cuts. The next day, Naomi’s boss asked her to come into
his office and close the door behind her.
Linda was having financial difficulties after graduating
from college. She worked overtime and lived very
meagerly but still had trouble making her loan payments.
One day, she received a letter from her grandfather saying
that he wanted to help. A check for $8,000 was enclosed.
Dana always wanted a puppy, but her parents said it was
too much of a hassle. One summer afternoon, Dana’s
parents returned from a supposed trip to the grocery
store, and Dana heard barking from inside her garage.




One afternoon, Caitlin was running through her house
while playing tag with her friend. After going through a
doorway, Caitlin slammed the door behind her, but her
fingers were caught in the door. When they opened the
door, two of her fingers were broken.
All experiments used the same set of 200 verbal stimuli in which a char-
acter experienced 1 of 20 different emotions (validated with 20-AFC
experiment on MTurk), conveyed via a description of an emotion-eliciting
event (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).because it is higher dimensional. Thus, RSA can go beyond clas-
sification to test specific alternative models of the dimensions
that structure the representation of others’ emotions.
Candidate Feature Spaces for Emotion Inference
Research in affective neuroscience has typically examined rep-
resentations involved in both first-person emotional experience
and emotional face perception. Here, we address a different
question, concerning observers’ inferences about others’ emo-
tions. Nevertheless, it is plausible that intuitive theories of
emotion are fairly veridical (in order to be maximally useful in so-
cial interactions) and even informed by one’s own emotional ex-
periences. Therefore, models of the structure of first-person
emotional experience may also capture the basis for third-per-
son emotion attribution. We drew from prior literature on
emotional experience three alternativemodels of the representa-
tional space of emotions.
A dominant approach has been to represent emotions as com-
binations of more basic affective states. According to basic
emotion theory, complex and subtle emotions can be under-
stood as combinations of 5–6 basic emotional states, each asso-
ciated with a prototypical facial expression and innate neural
substrate [1, 20, 21]. A second theory is the ‘‘circumplex’’ model,
which posits that emotions are composed of only two primitive1946 Current Biology 25, 1945–1954, August 3, 2015 ª2015 Elsevierdimensions—valence and arousal [9, 22, 23]—corresponding
to two innate systems implemented in distinct neural circuits
and recruited to varying degrees across different emotions
[24–26]. In this view, neural representations of emotion may be
reduced to a linear combination of these two neurophysiological
dimensions [27].
Although many have focused on the differences between
these two proposals [28, 29], both aim to represent emotions
in terms of combinations of a small number of basic affective
states, rooted in innate neural substrates. An alternative
approach in affective science, termed ‘‘appraisal theory,’’ aims
to instead characterize emotions in terms of people’s interpreta-
tions or ‘‘appraisals’’ of the events around them [30, 31]. Re-
searchers have proposed specific sets of event appraisals that
correspond to different emotions (see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures for further details) and shown that these fea-
tures capture differences in the emotions subjects experience
across different situations [32, 33].
All three of these theories have shown some utility in charac-
terizing first-person emotional experiences. Here, we investi-
gated whether any of these approaches successfully capture
subjects’ intuitive attributions of others’ emotions and whether
they could explain the representational spaces in MPFC and
other ToM regions. If people reason about others’ emotions us-
ing an intuitive causal theory (embedded in a larger intuitive
ToM), this theory should capture regularities in the situations
that cause different emotions. Thus, we hypothesized that the
representations involved in inferring the emotions of others,
especially based on short verbal narratives, would be better
captured by abstract event features than by combinations of
basic emotional dimensions.
We therefore used RSA to determine whether representations
in regions that discriminate our 20 categories are best captured
by one of three candidate spaces (see Figure 2): a ‘‘circumplex’’
space defined by independent subjects’ judgments (Amazon
Mechanical Turk [MTurk]; see Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures) of valence and arousal for each stimulus, a ‘‘basic
emotion’’ space defined by judgments of the extent to which
the stimulus elicited each of six basic emotions (happy, sad,
angry, afraid, disgusted, or surprised), and a space of abstract
event features derived from appraisal theory. For this third
model, we generated a set of 38 event features thought to reli-
ably vary across different emotion concepts (e.g., ‘‘Did someone
cause this situation intentionally, or did it occur by accident?’’;
See Supplemental Experimental Procedures for appraisal fea-
tures and selection process). Importantly, the latter space differs
from the other two not only in its dimensionality (38 dimensions
versus 6 or 2) but also in its content: rather than reducing the
space of emotions to a smaller set of purportedly ‘‘basic’’ affec-
tive states, it aims to encode emotions in terms of abstract fea-
tures of the causal contexts that tend to elicit them. To test which
feature space best explains the neural representation of these
stimuli, we computed the similarity of emotion conditions within
each proposed feature space and compared the RDMs of candi-
date models to neural RDMs derived from patterns of activity
across voxels in each ROI.
Of course, the hypothesis that neural representations of
emotion concepts are best captured by a high-dimensional
space of abstract event features is not incompatible with theLtd All rights reserved
Figure 1. Classification Results
(A) Above-chance 20-way classification of emo-
tions in all ToM regions.
(B) Whole-brain random-effects analysis of ToM
localizer (false belief > false photo, red); searchlight
map for 20-way emotion classification (blue);
overlap (purple).
(C) Classification accuracy broken down by
emotion: average classification accuracy for each
emotion condition (±SEM across exemplars) in
behavioral judgments.
(D) Correlation between behavioral classification
accuracies (from C) and neural classification accu-
racies for each emotion class (based on errors of an
SVM trained and tested onMMPFC voxel patterns).claim that simpler dimensions like valence and arousal con-
tribute to the organization of our emotion knowledge. For
example, we included features such as goal consistency and
pleasantness that intuitively relate to the dimension of valence.
The question, then, is whether the representations in regions
like MPFC can be exhausted by one of the simpler spaces.
With this approach, we show that it is possible to characterize
the fine-grained representational structure of a high-level human
reasoning capacity like emotion attribution.
RESULTS
Classification
In the scanner, subjects (n = 22) read 200 stimuli describing sit-
uations that would cause a particular emotion (see Experi-
mental Procedures; example stimuli provided in Table 1). To
confirm that these stimuli elicit reliable fine-grained emotion at-
tributions, a group of subjects on MTurk were asked to choose
which of 20 emotion labels best described the emotion of the
character in each stimulus. These subjects performed well
above chance (relative to the intended emotion), classifying
the stimuli with 65% accuracy (chance = 5%; Figure 1C; see
Supplemental Information for evidence that subjects attribute
consistent emotions). This classification accuracy provided a
benchmark with which to compare different models and brain
regions.
To identify regions in which neural patterns contain informa-
tion about emotions, we first replicated the finding that MPFC
contains abstract emotion representations by testing whether
neural patterns in MPFC could distinguish the valence in single
trial estimates of these verbal stimuli. We functionally localizedCurrent Biology 25, 1945–1954, August 3, 2015MPFC and other ToM regions in individual
subjects (see Figure S1). We selected a
subset of conditions that most closely
align with the positive and negative condi-
tions used previously [14] and tested
whether neural patterns in MPFC would
support decoding of valence. Replicating
prior work, classification of valence was
reliably above chance in both DMPFC
(M(SEM) = 0.610(0.028), t(19) = 3.889,
p < 0.001) and MMPFC (0.603(0.019),
t(19) = 5.530, p < 0.001).We then investigated whether these or other regions contain
information about the full set of 20 emotions. A whole-brain
searchlight revealed that the set of regions that could reliably
decode the 20 emotions was largely restricted to regions of the
ToM network (particularly DMPFC, RTPJ, LTPJ; see Figure 1B
and Table S1). The searchlight analysis exhibited striking overlap
with the set of regions recruited for ToM (Figure 1B shows over-
lap between the searchlight [family-wise error, FWE p < .05, k >
25] and the random effects analysis of false belief > false photo-
graph from the localizer task, shown at p < .001 uncorrected) and
justified our continued focus on these a priori ROIs. Consistent
with the searchlight results, we were able to classify emotions
with above-chance accuracy (1 out of 20 emotions, 5%) based
on neural patterns in all individually localized ToM regions (Fig-
ure 1A; Table S2). Because these analyses involved training
and testing across stimulus items, above-chance classification
indicates a representation of emotion that generalizes across
otherwise highly variable verbal scenarios.
Moreover, in the judgments provided by subjects on MTurk,
there were reliable differences across the emotion categories in
the extent towhich subjects provided the expected emotion label
(one-way ANOVA: F(19,180) = 4.99, p < 0.001; see Figure 1C),
which provided another signature with which to compare neural
representations. We computed separate accuracies for each
emotion category in each ROI and correlated these with the
behavioral emotion labeling accuracies. In all ROIs, the accuracy
of neural classifications for different emotions was significantly
correlatedwith the accuracy levels observed in the emotion judg-
ments of the MTurk behavioral raters (see Table S2; see Fig-
ure 1D). Thus, the reliable across-emotion accuracy differences
observed behaviorally were paralleled in the emotion-specificª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1947
Figure 2. Competing Behavioral Feature Spaces Derived from MTurk Ratings
(A–C) Matrix of emotions 3 average dimension scores for the appraisal space (A), the six basic emotion space (B), and the circumplex space (C).
(D) Classification of 20 emotions (across stimulus exemplars) using information from each of the three competing spaces (±SEM across exemplars). Orange
dotted line reflects chance (.05); blue dotted line reflects behavioral performance (.65).accuracies of these neural populations (see Figure S1B for neural
confusion matrices).
RSA
Representational similarity analyses were then used to test spe-
cific hypotheses about the structure of the representations in
these regions. We generated three competing feature spaces
using independent behavioral ratings (Figure 2A) and tested
which feature space could best capture the neural representa-
tion of the 20 emotions. We first analyzed the behavioral data
alone, assessing the extent to which emotion categories could
be reliably classified based on feature vectors in each of these
candidate spaces. Specifically, we tested whether models
trained on each of the feature vectors for a subset of stimuli could
reliably classify the emotion label of untrained stimuli (see Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures). Do any of these feature
spaces provide a stimulus representation sufficient to match
the performance of human subjects in discriminating these 20
emotions (65%)?We found that although all three feature spaces
classified well above a chance level of 5%, the appraisal feature
space outperformed the other lower-dimensional spaces (57%,
compared to behavioral benchmark of 65%; see Figure 2B; note
because we used cross-validated accuracy, this analysis is not
biased by the dimensionality of themodels). Using a paired sam-
ples t test across individual items, we found that the abstract
appraisal space performed reliably better than the circumplex
space (t(199) = 8.288, p < 0.001) and the basic emotion space
(t(199) = 2.176, p = 0.031).
RDMs derived from these three feature spaces were then
compared to neural RDMs in each region to identify the space
that best accounts for the similarity of the emotion conditions
in their neural patterns. Because the appraisal RDM could
perform best simply because it better discriminates the 20 emo-
tions, we compared its performance to that of a pure categorical1948 Current Biology 25, 1945–1954, August 3, 2015 ª2015 Elseviermodel and an RDM defined from the behavioral confusion matrix
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures), both of which
also successfully discriminate the emotions (Figure 3). We
also tested a model in which condition similarity is defined in
terms of similarity of word-frequency vectors, a representation
frequently used in fully automated approaches to emotional
text classification such as sentiment analysis of reviews or
other social media [34, 35]. Does the appraisal space outperform
a raw word-level representation of the stimuli? Finally, we
tested three control spaces capturing possible lower-level di-
mensions: reading ease, syntactic complexity, and rated inten-
sity (confounded with motor response) (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures).
For each region, we correlated RDMs for the competing
feature spaces to neural RDMs from individual ROIs (distances
of the 20 emotions in their voxel-wise patterns). In the two
MPFC subregions, the similarity of emotion conditions in voxel-
level patterns was positively correlated with similarity in the
space of 38 appraisal dimensions (group-level Kendall’s tau,
DMPFC: 0.28; MMPFC: 0.21). Correlations with individual sub-
ject neural RDMs revealed a reliable relationship between the
neural and model RDMs (see Table 2; Figure 4). In both DMPFC
and MMPFC, the neural similarities were more correlated with
the appraisal space than with either basic or circumplex spaces
(see Table 3). In both regions, the appraisal RDM also outper-
formed the categorical and confusion spaces, suggesting that
the superior performance of this model cannot be fully explained
by its ability to better differentiate the 20 emotions. The appraisal
space also outperformed the RDM defined from word-token fre-
quencies and the control spaces for reading ease, syntactic
complexity, and intensity (see Table 3).
We conducted the same analyses in the remaining ToM re-
gions (RTPJ, LTPJ, PC, RSTS, and VMPFC): neural representa-
tions in these ROIs were also reliably correlated with theLtd All rights reserved
Figure 3. RSA Methods
Representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs)
encode the pairwise Euclidean distances between
different emotions within each feature space. For
each region, a neural RDM captures the pairwise
Euclidean distances between different emotions in
the patterns of activity elicited across voxels
(DMPFC shown here). Feature spaces are fit to the
neural data by computing correlations between
feature space RDMs and neural RDMs for each
region in each subject. In addition to the three
candidate theories, we also test confusion and
categorical spaces. Given that the appraisal space
best captures the distinctions between the 20
emotions, it could outperform simpler models
simply by virtue of its superior emotion discrimi-
nation. To test this possibility, we compare the
appraisal space to a pure categorical RDM, which
assumes that all emotions are perfectly and
equally discriminable. As a more conservative test,
we compute the correlation between neural RDMs
and the raw behavioral confusion matrix. Like the
categorical model, this confusion RDM captures
the distinctions between the 20 emotions but also
encodes similarity between different emotions as
reflected in the behavioral confusions. If the
appraisal space outperforms these two models, it
suggests that the appraisal space fits the neural
data in virtue of the features rather than emotion
discriminability alone.appraisal space RDM (see Figure 4 for RTPJ; see Figure S3 for
results from other ToM regions), and no region was reliably
more correlated with the basic emotion or circumplex spaces.
The 38-dimensional space outperformed competing spaces in
all ToM regions except for VMPFC (where the best-performing
space was the word-frequency representation). However,
DMPFC and MMPFC were the only regions in which the high-
dimensional space significantly outperformed all models.
Region Contributions
We could reliably decode emotions in all ToM ROIs, and the
appraisal space did the best job of capturing the neural similarity
space in most regions. Is the same information represented
redundantly, or might these regions contribute differently to
the representation of emotions? When classifying only valence,
a model trained with voxels from all ToM ROIs (M(SEM) =
0.581(0.016), t(21) = 4.942, p < 0.001) performed less well than
a model trained only with voxels in DMPFC (58.1% relative to
61%). However, when classifying the full set of 20 emotions, a
model trained with voxels from all regions outperformed any of
the individual ROIs, raising the possibility of non-redundant infor-
mation across ToM regions.
To test for possible representational differences across the
ROIs, we first used an iterative split-half reliability analysis
(Supplemental Experimental Procedures). We found that neu-Current Biology 25, 1945–1954, August 3, 2015ral RDMs in DMPFC and RTPJ were
more correlated with themselves than
with the other ROI (Mwithin = 0.178,
Mbetween = 0.164, p < 0.001) and that
this effect was not observed betweenMMPFC and RTPJ (Mwithin = 0.121, Mbetween = 0.123, p <
0.922). To further characterize potential non-redundancy, we
explored whether the regions differed in the particular situa-
tion features they represent. Rather than compute separate
RDMs for each of 38 appraisal features, we identified a
reduced set of ten features that captured the most unique
variance in behavioral ratings across items, using a stepwise
regression approach (see Figures S2 and S4; Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). We then computed the RDMs for
this ten-dimensional space and also for each of the ten fea-
tures individually and correlated each with the neural RDMs
in different regions. The neural RDMs in all regions were reli-
ably correlated with the RDM of the ten-feature space (see
Table 2; Figure S4), which appears to capture much of the
representational structure of the initial 38-dimensional space
(Figure S2). Consistent with the results above, a repeated-
measures ANOVA on the neural-model correlations for each
feature (with ROI and feature as within-subjects factors) re-
vealed a significant ROI 3 feature interaction for the compar-
ison of DMPFC and RTPJ (F(9,171) = 2.06, p = 0.036), but not
between MMPFC and RTPJ (F(9,171) = 1.036, p = 0.414).
Together, these results provide evidence that multiple ToM re-
gions are involved in the attribution of emotion and that some
of these regions may contribute unique information to the final
representational space that governs behavior.ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1949
Table 2. Neural RDM Results
ROI Model M SEM Z df Significance
DMPFC appraisals .08 .02 3.32 19 <0.001
ten features .08 .02 3.21 19 <0.001
MMPFC appraisals .06 .02 2.95 19 <0.002
ten features .05 .02 2.61 19 <0.004
RTPJ appraisals .07 .02 3.59 21 <0.001
ten features .06 .01 3.55 21 <0.001
ToM
network
appraisals .09 .02 3.68 21 <0.001
ten features .08 .02 3.68 21 <0.001
Model-neural correlations for 38-dimensional abstract event space and
reduced space of ten features. df, degrees of freedom.DISCUSSION
Decades of research in the science of emotion have aimed to
characterize emotions in terms of some low-dimensional space
of basic affective primitives [1, 23, 27, 36]. Behaviorally, we
find that a space of abstract event features, derived from work
in appraisal theory [33], reliably outperforms these simpler
spaces in discriminating the 20 different emotions in our stimuli.
Consistent with previous reports [13, 14], we find that neural rep-
resentations in MPFC contain information about attributed emo-
tions.Whereas prior studies focused on coarse distinctions (e.g.,
valence), we classify a set of nuanced emotions at above-
chance levels. Moreover, by expanding to a rich space of elicit-
ing situations, we are able to decode attributed emotions in all
regions of the ToM network, and the searchlight results suggest
that this information is largely restricted to these regions (partic-
ularly MPFC, RTPJ, and LTPJ).
Although these classifications are reliably above chance (5%),
they are far from reaching the accuracy observed behaviorally
(65%). This discrepancy between neural and behavioral classifi-
cation could arise because the population code in these regions
is insufficient to explain the behavior and/or because single trial
estimates of fMRI data provide a noisy, blurred measurement of
the underlying neural code. However, across different emotions,
there are reliable correlations in the average accuracy of the neu-
ral populations and of independent behavioral ratings, providing
support for the role of these regions in emotion attribution
behaviors.
The present work also probes the underlying representa-
tional structure that supports emotion discrimination. Previous
literature [12–14] is consistent with the possibility that MPFC
codes a limited space of affective dimensions such as valence
and/or arousal. Moreover, even in our neural classification an-
alyses, a region could support 20-way classification at above-
chance levels by coding only a single dimension or feature
that varies across emotions. Using RSA, we find not only
that brain regions involved in ToM reasoning contain informa-
tion about attributed emotions but also that this information
is best captured by the high-dimensional space of event
features.
In the majority of ToM regions, the similarity of emotion con-
ditions in their voxel response patterns is most correlated with
the similarity of the emotions in the space of appraisals. This
result suggests a neural code that does not reduce to a simpler1950 Current Biology 25, 1945–1954, August 3, 2015 ª2015 Elsevierset of distinctions, such as valence and arousal, and provides
novel insight into the granularity of the emotion representations
in MPFC and other ToM regions. Together, the data suggest
that human emotion attribution is organized around abstract
features of the causal context in which different emotions occur
rather than the affective primitives that have dominated prior
research.
A challenge for future work will be characterizing the scope
and specificity of the neural representations in ToM regions.
Do these neural populations contain representations specific
to attributed emotion, coded within a space of emotion-relevant
event features, or contain information in the form of domain-gen-
eral semantic representations used in the service of emotion
attribution? It is quite possible that these event representations
function as intermediate features in the service of diverse infer-
ential processes in addition to emotion attribution. Ultimately,
successfully inferring emotions depends on a rich body of world
knowledge, and neural populations specific to social cognition
must interface with more general-purpose semantic systems.
Characterizing information flow within and between these
different networks will be an important avenue for future
research.
Characterizing Representational Spaces
To characterize the feature space that governs representation
of attributed emotion in the human brain, we draw on methods
that have been fruitful in recent research on visual object
recognition and object semantics, where researchers have
tested a range of high-level and low-level features that could
capture neural similarity of different objects [18, 37–39]. In
one study, Mitchell and colleagues [38] coded object words
in terms of co-occurrence with a set of verbs hypothesized
to pick out relevant semantic dimensions (e.g., ‘‘manipulate,’’
‘‘taste’’), a representation that was sufficient to support neural
classification of untrained stimuli. Later work showed that a
corpus-based co-occurrence space is outperformed by a
space derived from behavioral ratings on a set of a priori ob-
ject properties (e.g., is it alive?) [40]. The present research is
most similar to this second approach, relying on behavioral
ratings of a set of hypothesized event features. We show
that it is possible to generate candidate representational
spaces for domains of high-level cognition such as emotion
inference and to use these spaces to characterize patterns
of activity in ToM brain regions.
The study of object representation has also made headway on
understanding differences across regions and temporal stages
[37, 39], with RSA in particular providing a flexible framework
for comparing the structure of the representations along the
ventral pathway [41]. Interestingly, the present results provide
preliminary evidence that ToM regions (particularly DMPFC
versus RTPJ) may differ in their contributions to emotion infer-
ence. Further work is needed to characterize the precise compu-
tational roles of these regions and how they interact with other
networks to form a processing stream.
As has been the case in research on object representation, we
assume that future studies of emotion attribution will yield stim-
ulus representations that outperform the 38-dimensional space
explored here. Many early approaches to modeling neural object
representations involved hand-picked features (e.g., 25 verbs)Ltd All rights reserved
Figure 4. RSA Results
Mean correlation (Kendall’s tau) between candi-
date model RDMs and individual subject neural
RDMs (±SEM across subjects). Dotted line shows
the noise ceiling (see Table S3).[38] and often manual coding of stimuli within those spaces [37,
42]. However, recent research using high-throughput, data-
driven approaches has yielded computational models that can
be applied to raw stimuli (i.e., images) and achieve high quanti-
tative fit to neural patterns [43]. Here, candidate features were
selected based on prior theories without subsequent optimiza-
tion (this list may therefore contain redundant or uninformative
features, and some additional features are likely necessary),
and the stimuli required manual annotation (MTurk ratings). In
fact, the model using 38 abstract event features falls short of hu-
man behavioral performance when labeling stimuli (57% versus
65%accurate), indicating that this collection of features does not
completely capture intuitive emotion knowledge. A data-driven
discovery method might be better able to capture the full range
of relevant dimensions; future research would ideally identify
new sets of optimized features (either event features or some
other candidate basis) and ways to infer these features directly
from text.
A second, more fundamental limitation is that this approach
aims to encode human emotion knowledge in terms of lists of
appraisal checks applied to each stimulus. While this flat feature
vector approach has been productive in other domains [44] andCurrent Biology 25, 1945–1954, August 3, 2015proved useful in the present paradigm, it is
unlikely that representations in domains of
high-level cognition such as ToM can be
reduced to operations over lists of associ-
ated features [45]. For example, an attrib-
uted emotion depends critically on the
temporal and causal order of the different
elements of the event (e.g., eating a whole
cake and then swearing to keep to your
diet versus swearing to keep your diet
and then eating a whole cake). To capture
the causal and compositional nature of
emotion inference [4], future research
may need to incorporate structured,
generative knowledge representations
from other areas of cognitive science
[46]. The present findings lay groundwork
for such research by providing an initial
sketch of specific dimensions that might
structure human emotion concepts and a
framework for evaluating competing
models of this knowledge.
Conclusions
Despite important open questions, the
present data provide novel insight into
the representations underlying human
emotion inference and the neural popula-
tions that support them.We show that it is
possible to decode attributed emotions
from neural patterns in regions involved in mental state
reasoning and provide quantitative insight into the underlying
representational structure that supports this inferential ability.
Together, the results suggest that our knowledge of others’
emotions is abstract and high dimensional, that brain regions
associated with emotion perception and inference contain infor-
mation about relatively fine-grained emotional distinctions, and
that the neural representations in these regions are not reduc-
ible to more primitive affective primitives such as valence and
arousal.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Further details on experimental procedures (e.g., ROI selection and univariate
analyses) are provided in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Behavioral Feature Ratings
A separate set of MTurk subjects (n = 250) provided ratings (1–10 scale) for
each of the stimuli on each of the features of the three competing feature
spaces (Supplemental Experimental Procedures). A given subject rated
stimuli on either features from the abstract event space (e.g., ‘‘Did someone
cause this situation intentionally, or did it occur by accident?’’; see Feature
Table in Supplemental Information) or dimensions corresponding to the
basic emotion space (e.g., ‘‘Was <character> happy in this situation?’’)ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1951
Table 3. Neural RDM Results
Comparison ROI M1 M2 z Significance
Appraisals versus
basic emotions
DMPFC .08 .05 3.02 .002
MMPFC .06 .03 2.31 .021
Appraisals versus
circumplex
DMPFC .08 .06 2.84 .005
MMPFC .06 .04 2.80 .005
Appraisals versus
word frequency
DMPFC .08 .02 2.99 .003
MMPFC .06 .02 2.17 .030
Appraisals versus
confusions
DMPFC .08 .04 2.54 .011
MMPFC .06 .03 2.20 .028
Appraisals versus
categorical
DMPFC .08 .02 3.17 .002
MMPFC .06 .01 2.61 .009
Appraisals versus
reading ease
DMPFC .08 .02 2.39 .017
MMPFC .06 .01 2.02 .044
Appraisals versus
syntax
DMPFC .08 .03 2.50 .012
MMPFC .06 .02 1.98 .048
Appraisals versus
intensity
DMPFC .08 .02 3.21 .001
MMPFC .06 .03 2.05 .040
Statistical comparisons (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) of neural-model cor-
relations for the appraisal space compared to all other candidate models,
using neural RDMs in MMPFC (df = 19) and DMPFC (df = 19).and the circumplex space (e.g., ‘‘Did <character> find this situation to be
positive or negative?’’).
Feature-Based Classification of Behavioral Data
To test whether any of the three candidate spaces (basic emotion, circumplex,
and 38 appraisals) capture the full range of attributed emotions, we created an
item-by-feature matrix for each possible space and tested whether a model
(linear support vector machine [SVM]) trained on these features could classify
the 20 distinct emotions (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). We
tested whether each feature space provided a basis for emotion discrimination
that generalized across the different exemplars by using item-based cross-
validation folds and computing the average cross-item classification accuracy
for each feature space (comparing to the behavioral benchmark: 65%).
fMRI Emotion Attribution Task
In the emotion attribution task, subjects viewed 200 emotion stimuli, along with
ten stories describing physical pain [47]. The experiment consisted of ten runs
(7.37 min/run), each containing one exemplar for each of 21 trial types (20
emotion conditions, 1 pain). Each story was presented at fixation for 13 s, fol-
lowed by a 2 s window for a behavioral response. Subjects were instructed to
press a button to indicate the intensity of the character’s experience (1 to 4,
neutral to extreme), which focused subjects’ attention on the character’s
emotional state but ensured that behavioral responses (intensity) were orthog-
onal to discriminations of interest. The stories were presented in a jittered,
event-related design, with a central fixation cross presented between trials
at a variable inter-stimulus interval of 3-5-7 s. The order of conditions was
counterbalanced across runs and participants, and order of individual stories
for each condition was randomized.
fMRI Analyses
Acquisition and preprocessing details are provided in Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures.
Classification Analyses
We first aimed to replicate previous valence decoding in MPFC [14] by
choosing a subset of conditions that most closely matched the happy versus
sad emotions used in that study (‘‘excited,’’ ‘‘joyful,’’ ‘‘proud’’ versus ‘‘devas-
tated,’’ ‘‘disappointed,’’ ‘‘annoyed’’) and testing whether voxel patterns in1952 Current Biology 25, 1945–1954, August 3, 2015 ª2015 ElsevierMPFC could reliably classify the valence of these stimuli. We then tested
whether voxel patterns in MPFC or other ToM regions could reliably classify
the set of 20 emotions.
We conducted MVPA within ROIs that were functionally defined based on
individual subject localizer scans (including a ToM network ROI defined as
the union of each subject’s individually localized ROIs). We computed a single
voxel pattern for each individual trial by averaging the preprocessed bold im-
ages for the trial and Z scoring relative to the mean across all trial responses in
each voxel. The data were classified using a support vector machine; this clas-
sifier uses condition-labeled training data to learn a weight for each voxel, and
subsequent stimuli can then be assigned to one of two classes based on a
weighted linear combination of the responses in each voxel. For the 20-way
discrimination, multi-class classification was conducted with a one-versus-
one method [48]. Classification accuracy was averaged across ten cross-vali-
dation folds to yield a score for each subject per ROI, assessed with a one-
sample t test (one tailed) over individual accuracies (comparing to chance:
0.5 for positive versus negative; 0.05 for 20-way classification). See Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures for further details.
RSA
To create RDMs for the competing representational spaces, we first averaged
the feature vectors (from MTurk ratings) for each emotion condition (across
stimuli), yielding the emotion-by-feature matrices shown in Figure 2. For
each matrix, we then computed the Euclidean distance of feature vectors for
each pair of emotions.We conducted this analysis iteratively (n = 1,000) across
split halves of the data (five items per condition in each half), such that the self-
distances along the diagonal are meaningful. In addition to the five candidate
feature spaces (circumplex, basic emotions, appraisals, confusions, and cat-
egorical), we generated an additional space defined in terms of the similarity in
word occurrences across stimuli, as well as additional control spaces to
confirm that neural RDMs could not be explained in terms of lower-level prop-
erties of the stimuli: reading ease, syntactic complexity, and behavioral ratings
of intensity (Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Neural RDMs were computed separately for each region in each subject
with the same procedure as for feature space RDMs, except that features
were voxel-wise neural responses rather than behavioral ratings (see Supple-
mental Information). We computed similarity of the conditions (Euclidean dis-
tance) in their voxel patterns (conducted across even and odd subsets so that
the diagonal is interpretable), yielding an RDM for each region. To compare
neural and model similarity spaces, we then computed the rank correlation
(Kendall’s tau-a) between the model and neural RDMs for each region in
each subject and compared these correlations to chance (average Kendall’s
tau = 0) with a Wilcoxon test. We also compared the fit of different models
by conducting a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the correlations for
different pairs of models.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
four figures, and three tables and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.06.009.
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